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THE ATTEMPTED MURDER CONVICTION, PREMISED ON 
INSTRUCTIONS ON KNOWING OR DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE 
MENSREA LEVELS, MUST BE REVERSED. 
The State cites R. 236: 325 for the proposition that trial counsel for Powell invited 
the erroneous jury instruction which permitted a conviction of attempted murder to enter 
on a finding of knowing and depraved indifference mens reas. State's brief at 2. 
Page 325 of volume 236 reflects the trial court's assertion that "we stipulated to 
jury instructions" except for the disputed lesser included offense instructions (R. 236: 
325). 
Assuming arguendo that this is fairly read as trial counsel's overt approval of the 
erroneous attempted murder instruction, it is not fairly read as invited error. The invited 
2 
error doctrine is designed to prevent parties from taking a favorable position at trial in 
hopes of winning, and then reversing positions on appeal after the trial strategy fails. See, 
e.g.. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). There is no conceivable trial 
strategy that was served by permitting an attempted murder conviction to enter on two 
lower mens rea levels than the prosecution was bound to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Assuming arguendo that counsel did "invite" the error, this inconceivable strategy 
is subject to review under the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine, which 
demonstrates that Powell's attempted murder conviction must be reversed. See Powell's 
opening brief at 10-15. 
In arguing that the erroneous attempted murder instruction was harmless error 
because the evidence conclusively proved intentional attempted murder, the State presents 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, and disregards much of the 
evidence upon which the jury might have relied to acquit Powell of attempted murder for 
lack of proof of mens rea. Compare State's brief at 4 n.2 (noting that State's brief 
presented facts in light most favorable to verdict) and at 17-18 (arguing as though it is 
indisputable that Powell threatened to and tried to kill Ellis), with Powell's opening brief 
at 11-14 (detailing conflicts in the testimony of Ellis and Ross, and problems with the 
credibility of those two witnesses). 
The State also fails to recognize that the jury disbelieved at least part of the 
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testimony of Ellis and Ross, the two witnesses whose testimony was essential to the 
attempted murder conviction, because the jury acquitted Powell of aggravated robbery, 
despite the fact that Ellis' and Ross' testimony concerning this alleged offense did not 
conflict. Compare State's brief at 4 n.2 (noting that State's brief omitted facts pertaining 
to aggravated robbery) and at 17-18 (arguing as though it is indisputable that Powell 
threatened to and tried to kill Ellis) with Powell's opening brief at 13-14 (providing 
record citations and argument regarding the fact that the jurors acquitted of aggravated 
robbery, despite consistent testimony by Ross and Ellis on that count). 
In assessing whether the erroneous attempted murder instruction was prejudicial, 
this Court should perform the harmless error analysis in the standard and fair manner, by 
assessing all the evidence upon which the State was forced to rely in seeking to convict 
Powell. See, e ^ , State v. Casey. 2003 UT 55, ^ 49, 82 P.3d 1106 ("AU of the 
circumstantial evidence clearly indicates that Casey acted intentionally.") (Emphasis 
added). 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
POWELL'S LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS. 
The State notes that trial counsel argued that identity was the only issue for the 
jury to determine and that the State otherwise had a strong case. State's brief at 11-12. 
Given that the trial court refused to give the lesser included offense instructions on 
aggravated assault and assault, trial counsel was not in a position to argue those to the 
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jury. 
The State argues that this Court should rely on the line of cases which withhold 
lesser included offense instructions from those defendants who altogether deny having 
committed the offenses charged. State's brief at 21-22. See also Powell's opening brief 
at 18-19, recognizing State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah 1984), as an example of 
cases to the same effect. 
The State never explains why those defendants who rely on or assert their 
presumption of innocence are less entitled to the full benefit of the reasonable doubt 
standard than the defendants who admit their guilt of lesser included offenses. But see 
State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551, 555-56 (Utah 1984) (recognizing that lesser included 
offense instructions give the defendants the full benefit of the reasonable doubt standard, 
and reversing conviction for aggravated assault for lack of a lesser included offense 
instruction on threatening with a dangerous weapon, despite the fact that the defendant 
denied pointing his gun at the officer). 
Nor does the State explain how it is in society's interest in the integrity of the 
justice system to convict someone of a greater offense than the evidence may warrant, 
merely because the person did not admit his guilt of the lesser offense. But see In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof serves 
society's interest in the integrity of the justice system). 
This Court should reconsider the Shabata line of cases in this case, and should hold 
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in light of the rationales of Oldroyd and Winship that anytime the "whole of the 
evidence" establishes a basis for acquitting of the greater offense and convicting of a 
lesser, the trial court must give the defendant and society the full benefit of the beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard, and instruct the jury on the lesser included offense. See State 
v. Oldroyd. 685 P.2d 551, 555-56 (Utah 1984).1 
In arguing that the evidence did not provide a basis for acquitting Powell of the 
1
 The facts found in Oldroyd to justify a lesser offense instruction for brandishing 
a weapon exemplify the liberality with which lesser offense instructions should be given. 
As the Court explained in reversing the aggravated assault conviction for the absence of a 
lesser included instruction on threatening with a dangerous weapon, 
In the case at hand, there is a rational basis for acquitting Oldroyd of 
aggravated assault and convicting him of threatening with a dangerous 
weapon. Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant, 
there was evidence presented that showed that the gun Oldroyd had was not 
loaded. The officers all testified that the bullets for the gun were in 
Oldroyd's pocket when he was arrested. Oldroyd himself testified that he 
had unloaded the gun before approaching his wife's apartment. Therefore, 
that evidence is subject to the alternative interpretation that the gun was not 
loaded and was thus not deadly. Further, there was evidence that clearly 
negated a threat by defendant to do bodily harm: there was no verbal threat, 
no direct evidence that the gun was cocked, no bullets in the gun. All 
witnesses testified that the stairwell was dark. Oldroyd testified that he did 
not hear the officers approaching and did not recognize Officer Evans when 
the officer suddenly shone the light directly in Oldroyd's face. Oldroyd 
further testified that he was frightened of being shot himself. Both Oldroyd 
and Evans testified that Oldroyd, after throwing his gun out, said to "go 
ahead and shoot me." Given this evidence, the intent to threaten Evans was 
clearly in dispute. A jury could reasonably conclude that there was no 
intention to do bodily injury to the officer while still believing that Oldroyd 
drew or exhibited the revolver in an angry and threatening manner. 
Oldroyd at 555-56. 
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charged offense of attempted murder, the State fails to acknowledge or fulfill its duty to 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, e.g.. State v. Crick, 675 
P.2d 527, 532 (Utah 1983). See State's brief at 22-27 (arguing the evidence consistently 
with its statement of facts, in the light most favorable to the verdict). 
By reviewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to Powell, this Court 
can readily conclude that the jury may well have acquitted Powell of attempted murder 
and convicted him of a lesser offense of assault or aggravated assault. See Powell's 
opening brief at 3-7 (statement of facts detailing all the weaknesses in the State's case); at 
11-14 (discussing evidence which undermines finding of intent to kill); at 20-
21 (explaining how jury might have acquitted of attempted murder and convicted of lesser 
offense). 
III. 
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
AND EVIDENTIARY ERRORS REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
A. ADEQUACY OF BRIEFING 
The State seeks to avoid this Court's addressing of Powell's claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct and evidentiary errors by assailing the adequacy of the briefing 
in Point III of Powell's opening brief. State's brief at 27-29, 33. 
By reviewing Powell's opening brief, this Court may confirm that it complies in all 
respects with governing rule, Utah R. App. P. 24, in providing accurate factual assertions 
which are supported by record citations, and by discussing how the pertinent legal 
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authorities apply to those facts to require Powell's convictions. See Powell's opening 
brief at 28-38. 
To the extent that counsel for Powell did not brief the inadmissibility of Powell's 
felony conviction introduced by the prosecutor, this is explained by the fact that the 
prosecutor never identified any conviction to challenge on appeal, but instead had Powell 
attest to a prior conviction of a wholly unspecified felony conviction (R. 236: 319). 
B. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
The State does not try and support the prosecutor's argument that Powell tried to 
"blow her brains out" on four separate occasions (R. 237 at 369). 
However, the State claims that the evidence reasonably supports the prosecutor's 
closing arguments that in the motel room, Powell tried to shoot Ellis in the head and then 
racked the gun in an effort to load a bullet to shoot her again. State's brief at 31. 
However, the State's brief is in error in discussing the relevant evidence. The State cites 
R. 235: 122 for the proposition that after Ellis heard her assailant's gun click, the assailant 
then tried to fire the gun. 
Page 122 of volume 235 is the testimony of Ellis, which reflects Ellis rejecting this 
factual theory when the prosecutor posited it, and indicating that all she heard was the 
click of the gun, followed by the bullet falling on her shoe (R. 235: 122). 
The State's suggestion that Alex Huggard's testimony supports the prosecutor's 
argument that the assailant racked the gun in the motel room in a second effort to kill 
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Ellis in the motel room, State's brief at 31, does not account for Ellis' testimony that all 
she heard was the initial click, followed by the falling of the bullet on her shoe, and that 
she did not hear the assailant do anything else to the gun (R. 235: 122). 
The State asserts that Huggard testified that racking the gun ejects the spent 
cartridge and loads a new round, and that this supports the prosecutor's argument that 
Ellis' assailant racked the gun in an effort to load a new round into the firing chamber. 
State's brief at 31. In his demonstration, Huggard testified that the way to load a live 
round into the firing chamber of the semi-automatic gun is to fire the preceding round out 
of the chamber, and that racking the gun ejects a live round from the firing chamber (R. 
236: 264-65). He never testified or demonstrated that this racking action loads a new live 
round into the chamber (R. 236: 264-65). 
The relevant transcript pages from Ellis's and Huggard's testimony are in the 
addendum to this brief. 
The State suggests that the prosecutor's arguments were likely harmless because 
Powell relied on a defense of mistaken identity and did not challenge Ellis' account of the 
attack. State's brief at 31-32. Proper analysis of evidentiary prejudice does not focus 
exclusively on the defendant's defense, but instead requires the prosecution to prove the 
error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, e.g.. State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 1373 and 
n.21 (Utah 1986), by reviewing the evidence supporting and undermining the State's case, 
e.g.. State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486, 87 (Utah 1984), and resolves all reasonable doubts 
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in the defendant's favor, e ^ , State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah 1977). 
Proper assessment of the evidence in this case demonstrates the harmful nature of 
the error. See Powell's opening brief at 3-7 and 26-27. 
C. STANDARD OF REVIEW OF EVIDENTIARY CLAIMS 
The State claims that this Court should review the admission of evidence of 
Powell's felony conviction and the admission of evidence through a witness with no 
personal knowledge that Powell supposedly was booked under an alias, for an abuse of 
discretion because Powell does not challenge the interpretation of any rules in making 
these claims. State's brief at 3. 
Powell does claim that the admission of his criminal history violated Utah Rule of 
Evidence 404(b), and that the admission of his supposed provision of an alias through a 
witness without personal knowledge violated Rule of Evidence 602. See Powell's 
opening brief at 27-29. Accordingly, these legal issues may be addressed for correctness 
as matters of law. See, e ^ , Cazeras v. Cosby, 2003 UT 3, ^  11, 65 P.3d 1184. 
D. POWELL'S FELONY CONVICTION 
The State argues that under Utah R. Evid. 609, the prosecutor properly introduced 
evidence that Powell was convicted of an unspecified felony, and posits that this 
argument may have referred to Powell's convictions for felony theft, felony escape and 
theft by deception, which was apparently a misdemeanor. State's brief at 36. 
According to the presentence report upon which the State relies, the theft by 
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deception conviction is not classified as a felony, and must have been a misdemeanor, 
because the sentence imposed was jail and community service. Presentence report page 
6. Thus, this conviction was not the basis of the testimony that Powell was convicted of a 
felony. 
Charges of felony theft and felony escape are not admissible under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 609, because that rule requires crimes to have probative value which outweighs 
the prejudicial effect.2 Theft and escape have no intrinsic bearing on credibility, and 
The rule provides, 
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 
(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 
one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has 
been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value 
of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved 
dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment. 
(b) Time Limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more 
than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from 
the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court 
determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by 
specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence 
of a conviction more than ten years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the 
proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such 
evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence. 
(c) Effect of Pardon, Annulment, or Certificate of Rehabilitation. Evidence of a conviction is 
not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, 
certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation 
of the person convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime which was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the 
subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence. 
(d) Juvenile Adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible 
under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile 
11 
Ross's theft and escape convictions were never elucidated or proved to involve fraud or 
deceit. Accordingly, they had no probative value and were not admissible under Rule 
609. Compare, e.g.. State v. Bruce. 779 P.2d 646, 653-56 (Utah 1989) (defendants 
convictions for retail theft and attempted burglary were not admissible under 609, because 
they had no bearing on credibility). 
No felony conviction was admissible because the trial court never weighed the 
admissibility of any conviction under the factors identified in State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 
1325, 1334 (Utah 1986), and the proper weighing is prerequisite to the admission of such 
convictions. See, e ^ , State v. Bruce. 779 P.2d 646, 653-54 (Utah 1989). See also State 
v. Decorso. 1999 UT 57, f 21, 993 P.2d 837 (prior to admitting prior crime evidence, 
proponent must establish proper non-character purpose for the evidence). 
The State surmises that the evidence that Powell was convicted of an unspecified 
felony was not prejudicial, because the jurors were not informed of the nature of the 
felony or underlying facts. State's brief at 37. 
The fact that the jurors were not informed of the details or nature of Powell's 
conviction left them with no use for the felony conviction other than to convict Powell on 
the theory of propensity - that he must be guilty because it was his nature as a convicted 
adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible 
to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is 
necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. 
(e) Pendency of Appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render evidence of a 
conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible. 
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felon to commit crimes. Such evidence is notoriously prejudicial. See, e.g.. State v. 
Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f 15, 992 P.2d 951 (citing extensive case law prohibiting the 
admission of evidence of the defendant's other crimes unless the evidence is probative of 
something other than criminal propensity and is not unduly prejudicial), and certainly may 
have made the key difference on the highly questionable facts of the State's case, see 
Powell's opening brief at 3-7. 
E. TESTIMONY ABSENT PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 
The State suggests that because Powell admitted during a pretrial hearing that he is 
also known as James Johnson (R. 230: 2), it was proper or harmless error for the trial 
court to permit a witness who had no personal knowledge to testify that Powell was 
booked under this name (R. 236: 322-23), despite Powell's testimony that he was booked 
under his own name (R. 236: 319). State's brief at 37-39. 
The hearing to which the State refers is Mr. Powell's arraignment, wherein the 
magistrate reviewed the information which had been filed against him (R. 230: 2). The 
magistrate asked Powell if he was also known as James Johnson, and Powell responded, 
"Yeah, they say that." (R. 230: 2). The magistrate asked if that was the same person, and 
Powell responded, "Yeah. Yeah. Yeah." (R. 230: 2). 
By reviewing the information, this Court can confirm that the information lists 
James Johnson as an alias (R. 5). 
The fact that Powell acceded to the magistrate's questions regarding this alias 
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listed on the information at arraignment does nothing to prove that Powell provided this 
alias when he was booked, and does nothing to ameliorate the trial court's ruling which 
permitted the witness to testify that Powell was booked under this alias, despite the fact 
that the witness had no personal knowledge of this fact, in violation of Utah R. Evid. 602. 
See Powell's opening brief at 27-30. 
Nor does his acknowledgment of an alias at his arraignment prove the erroneous 
admission of the evidence that he provided an alias at booking harmless. The State's 
suggestion that the error was harmless because "the State would have had little trouble 
getting the defendant's alias before the jury" is wholly speculative, and diverges from 
proper harmless error analysis, which requires the Court to review the strengths and 
weaknesses of the State's case and assess whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
evidence influenced the verdict. See, e.g.. State v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 458-599 (Utah 
1989) (Court concluded after review of evidence that challenged error eroded the Court's 
confidence in the verdict and required reversal). 
CONCLUSION 
Because the cumulative effect of the errors undermines reasonable confidence in 
the fairness and reliability of the proceedings, this Court should reverse Powell's 
convictions and remand this matter for retrial. 
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Respectfully submitted this May 15^2006 
'A 
ElHabi 
Counsel for Mr. Powell 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, first class 
postage pre-paid to: Matthew Bates, 160 East 300 South, 6/h Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 this May 15,2006> 
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ADDENDUM 
TRANSCRIPT PAGE FROM ELLIS' TESTIMONY 
CONTRADICTING PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING ARGUMENTS 
A Well, first I turned to him and told him to do it, 
Hfd then I heard a clicking sound. 
Q Why did you tell him to do it? 
A Because I figured he was already there with a gun, 
Sid it to my head, and I pretty much lived my life on the edge 
m I just wasn?t going lay down and — I don't know why, I just 
ISQsn't going to lay down and take it, I guess, I don't know. I 
Just said — that was the first thing that came to my mind, do 
it. 
Q And did he? 
A Yeah. He tried. 
Q Obviously, the weapon didn't fire. After you heard 
jfche noise that indicated that he was trying to fire the gun 
into your head, did you hear him do anything else to the 
handgun? 
A I just heard clicking and then the bullet was — 
landed on my -- hit my shoe. 
Q So you heard something click and a bullet landed by 
your shoe? 
A Yes. 
Q Before he tried to fire the handgun, did he say 
anything like, This is a robbery, this is a stickup? 
A No. 
Q He just attempted to fire the gun? 
A Move, bitch, and I'll kill you, that's what he said. 
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TRANSCRIPT PAGES FROM ALEX HUGGARD'S TESTIMONY 
CONTRADICTING PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING ARGUMENTS 
•phis weapon works. 
I Insert the magazine into the weapon. Semiautomatic 
What it does, it will pick up the first round off from the 
I 
Magazine , the weapon w i l l — s l i d e goes forward. As you can 
'V 
1 
IpSee now the little red dot on the top is up, indicating that we 
phave a live round in the chamber. 
I Once you pull the trigger, you hear the trigger pop, 
I 
|the weapon will cycle itself and will continue to do that. 
¥ m 
jjtWhat it does is it picks up the next live round off from the I 
limagazine, pushing it forward, and resetting the trigger after 
f 
fit had ejected the spent round out of the weapon and you can 
fcontinue to fire this weapon as long as you pull the trigger. 
L 
f Q All right, sir. One more test. Would you take the 
jmagazine out, put a round in the chamber, a dummy round in the 
chamber. 
j A And I'm just going to drop this down through the 
J chamber here. 
j Q All right, sir, now — 
A You can see that the firing pin is cocked from the 
button here and that there is a round in the chamber. 
Q For the demonstration, I!d like you to show the jury, 
please, without the magazine, with a round in the chamber, 
J please pull the slide to the rear. 
j A Slide to the rear. 
I Q Slide to the rear. 264 
Did that round eject? 
A Yes, sir, it does. 
Q All right, sir. If I might ask you one more 
question. I show you what's been marked as State's Exhibit 
No. 14 previously admitted. Now, please put the gun down. Do 
you recognize that, sir? 
A I do, sir. Yes, I do. 
Q What is that? 
A This is a 9-millimeter, and I can tell you it's a 
Winchester silver-tip bullet, just from my experience, and it's 
a hollow-point and it's a — 
Q Would you please explain to the jury the significance 
of a hollow-point round? 
A NATO, which all of our, you know, countries are a 
part of, not all, but they will not allow hollow-point 
ammunition to be used because they feel it's inhumane. They 
only have ball ammunition because there were purposes to wound 
as opposed to kill. Hollow-point ammunition when it strikes an 
object, and I've been to ballistic and trajectory schools where 
we shoot into gelatin blocks, we try to establish, you know, a 
police ammunition which is going to be the most effective for 
us, and so I'm very well aware of the hollow points. What it 
does when it hits, the hollow-point — I can give you a 
demonstration. 
When it — when the bullet comes, when it hits it 
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